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Reading Between the (Surplus) Lines: Genzer v. James 
River Insurance Co. and the Tenth Circuit Loosening the 
Hold of Ridesharing Insurance Policy 
I. Introduction 
The rise of Uber and other popular ridesharing
1
 services has 
revolutionized the way society travels, but at a great cost. A recent study 
from the University of Chicago’s Becker-Friedman Institute showed that 
ridesharing has increased traffic deaths and accidents by 987 deaths 
annually, an increase of three percent per year.
2
 This sobering statistic puts 
a number on the risk related to the runaway success of Uber, Lyft, and other 
ridesharing services—and gives credence to the complaints regarding the 
radical way Uber, in particular, approaches risk management. 
Uber began operations in 2010 as a way for passengers to ride directly 
with commercial drivers, and in 2012, it began its far more well-known 
“peer-to-peer” ridesharing service (known as UberX).
3
 As of October 2020, 
Uber’s market share has since grown to seventy-one percent, well ahead of 
its main competitor Lyft (at twenty-seven percent).
4
 The essential 
ingredient to the ascent of Uber and other ridesharing companies—drivers 
using their own cars to transport passengers—also forms the backbone of 
its controversy in many areas, including liability. 
Uber insists it is not a “common carrier[]” (as for-hire transportation 
companies like taxicab companies are); rather, it posits itself as an 
“interactive computer service,” acting as an intermediary between drivers 
                                                                                                             
 1. The term “ridesharing” will be used in this Note as Genzer v. James River Insurance 
Co. uses that term to describe this type of service. 934 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 2019) 
(describing Genzer as a “rideshare driver for Uber”). Other terms used in this Note’s sources 
include “transportation network companies/TNCs” (used in state and federal statutes and 
some cases) and “ride-hailing services” (used in accordance with the Associated Press 
stylebook). See generally Benjamin Freed, Why You Shouldn’t Call Uber and Lyft “Ride-
Sharing,” WASHINGTONIAN (June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonian.com/2015/06/30/ 
why-you-shouldnt-call-uber-and-lyft-ride-sharing/. 
 2. John M. Barrios, Yael V. Hochberg & Hanyi Yi, The Cost of Convenience: 
Ridesharing and Traffic Fatalities 25 (Becker Friedman Inst. UChicago Working Paper No. 
2019-49, 2019), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_201949.pdf. 
 3. Mark Macmurdo, Comment, Hold the Phone! “Peer-to-Peer” Ridesharing Services, 
Regulation, and Liability, 76 LA. L. REV. 307, 309 (2015). 
 4. E. Mazareanu, Leading Ride-Hailing Companies in U.S. by Market Share 2017-
2020, STATISTA (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/910704/market-share-
of-rideshare-companies-united-states/. 
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 Uber’s Terms and Conditions plainly state it does “not provide 
transportation services . . . and has no responsibility or liability for any 
transportation services provided to [the user] by such third parties.”
6
  
In theory, this open-ended condition should impose liability on the 
individual driver’s insurer. Indeed, Uber’s original insurance structure used 
this as a guidepost, providing insurance on a contingency basis in the event 
a driver’s insurance policy would not cover them.
7
 However, exclusions in 
most conventional insurers’ policies that would otherwise impose liability 
generally do not apply to ridesharing.
8
 For example, a policy might apply to 
“carpools,” where drivers pick up riders, but might not extend this to 
“livery” coverage, where the driver or car owner profits from the ride—
with the latter usually requiring a more expensive policy.
9
  
Insurance regulators on the national and state levels have warned both 
Uber drivers and riders of potential coverage gaps.
10
 Because of these risks, 
Uber sources insurance coverage for its drivers and riders through third-
party insurers, including those in the surplus lines market.
11
 A surplus lines 
insurer, also known as a “specialty insurer,” operates outside of a state’s 
regulatory scheme and covers risks that other insurers will not.
12
 Uber’s 
                                                                                                             
 5. R.J. LEHMANN, R ST. INST., POL’Y STUDY NO. 28, BLURRED LINES: INSURANCE 
CHALLENGES IN THE RIDE-SHARING MARKET 3 (2014), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/04/RSTREET28-1.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Ron Lieber, The Question of Coverage for Ride Service Drivers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/your-money/auto-insurance/offload 
ing-the-risk-in-renting-a-car-ride.html. 
 8. LEHMANN, supra note 5, at 6. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See generally Commercial Ride-Sharing, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS: CTR. FOR INS. 
POL’Y & RSCH., https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_commercial_ride_sharing.htm 
(last updated Mar. 4, 2020); see also States Warn of Rideshare Risks for Passengers, NBC 
NEWS (June 5, 2014, 2:29 PM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/states-
warn-rideshare-risks-passengers-n116736 (“California, Connecticut, the District of 
Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Utah have all issued warnings about possible 
insurance risks from using rideshare services.”). 
 11. Judy Greenwald, Where a Driver’s Personal Coverage Leaves Off and Uber’s Picks 
Up, BUS. INS. (Apr. 10, 2016), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160410/ 
NEWS06/304109977/Business-Insurance-2016-Risk-Manager-of-the-Year-Gus-Fuldner-
uses-individual-ins. 
 12. Surplus Lines, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS: CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RSCH., 
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_surplus_lines.htm (last updated Sept. 22, 2020). 
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head of insurance has stated the company takes significant advantage of 
surplus lines insurance on account of this flexibility.
13
  
Most of the insurance companies Uber works with, such as Progressive 
Corp., are household names that issue all types of insurance.
14
 Conversely, 
James River Insurance Company, the defendant in the titular case, 
exclusively deals in surplus lines insurance, covering businesses with risks 
other underwriters would “simply decline.”
15
 Until James River’s decision 
in late 2019 to cancel all of its insurance policies issued to Rasier, LLC (a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Uber that acts as an intermediary for its 
contracts and insurance policies), Uber was its largest client.
16
 As deciding 
factors in winding down its Uber accounts nationwide, James River cited 
Florida’s large proportion of uninsured motorists, and California’s recently 
enacted statute designating Uber’s independent contractors as employees.
17
  
Even before James River cancelled its Uber policies, some insurance 
regulators expressed doubt over the company’s insurance model in the 
ridesharing context.
18
 They were concerned James River’s one-size-fits-all 
Uber policies contravened state regulations and provided inadequate 
coverage to drivers—particularly during the period between rides when a 




In response to these claims, one Uber representative said the company 
routinely provides $1 million in liability coverage during a pickup or ride.
20
 
Uber only feels the need to use “limited backup coverage” during the period 
in between rides, known as “Period 1” in the industry.
21
 In Uber’s view, 
“Period 1” is “the same as waiting at home for temp work.”
22
 On the 
                                                                                                             
 13. Greenwald, supra note 11. 
 14. Matthew Lerner, James River Trades Down on Uber Affiliate’s Policy 
Cancellations, BUS. INS. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/ 
20191009/NEWS06/912331083/James-River-trades-down-on-Rasier-policy-cancellations. 
 15. Welcome, JAMES RIVER INS. CO., https://www.jamesriverins.com/ (last visited Jan. 
14, 2021). 
 16. Lerner, supra note 14. 
 17. Suzanne Barlyn, Why James River Insurance Dumped Uber Account, INS. J. (Nov. 
8, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/11/08/547942.htm. 
 18. See Charles Elmore, Uber’s Florida Fight: Whose Insurance Pays and When, PALM 
BEACH POST (Sept. 24, 2015, 4:54 PM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/ubers-
florida-fight-whose-insurance-pays-and-when/nkWSg/. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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litigation front, coverage during “Period 1” with James River’s policies has 
become a major issue.
23
 In Genzer v. James River Insurance Co., the Tenth 
Circuit upheld a coverage denial for an Uber driver who suffered an 
accident during “Period 1.”
24
 
This Note will argue that the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Genzer, the first 
federal appellate court case in this emerging area of insurance litigation, 
continues an unfortunate trend. In recent years, courts have looked at 
insurance policy terms in the insured’s favor. In the specific context of 
ridesharing, though, courts seem more willing to strictly construe these 
terms without factoring in the ways they help ridesharing companies’ 
insurers avoid liability. By giving insurers the benefit of the doubt, even 
when a policy’s terms contravene state law, courts are unknowingly leaving 
a significant regulatory loophole open. 
Part II of this Note will detail the history of ridesharing regulation in 
Oklahoma and other jurisdictions, as well as key Oklahoma insurance laws 
applicable to Genzer’s facts. Part III will detail the facts of the case and the 
procedural history. Part IV will examine the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Genzer in detail. Finally, Part V will analyze the holding as applied to both 
ridesharing insurance law specifically and Oklahoma insurance law 
generally. 
II. Law Before the Case 
A. How Other Jurisdictions Have Generally Treated Uber & James River  
Initially, Uber and its competitors operated outside of the complex and 
vast regulatory frameworks governing urban and for-hire transportation, at 
both the municipal and state levels.
25
 Unlike the companies caught in those 
regulatory webs, such as cab companies and public transit services, 




As Uber, Lyft, and other ridesharing services gained in popularity, states 
took notice; many state and municipal governments began creating separate 
regulatory schemes specifically for these services instead of placing 
ridesharing into existing schemes for urban and for-hire transportation.
27
 In 
recent years, Uber and Lyft have even been “kicked out” of several 
                                                                                                             
 23. See infra Section II.A. 
 24. 934 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 25. Macmurdo, supra note 3, at 313–14. 
 26. See LEHMANN, supra note 5. 
 27. Macmurdo, supra note 3, at 315. 
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municipalities for not complying with tougher regulations on background 
checks and insurance, among other areas of regulation.
28
 
California, the birthplace of both Uber and Lyft, was one of the first 
states to impose a statewide regulatory scheme for ridesharing.
29
 In 2013, 
the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) imposed sanctions on 
Uber and Lyft for having “illegally operated as ‘charter-party carriers’ 
without licenses,” in violation of a multitude of regulations governing “for-
hire transportation” and common carriers in California.
30
 In September of 
that year, the CPUC created a new carrier category specifically for 
ridesharing services: “[t]ransportation [n]etwork [c]ompanies.”
31
  
Many other states have since followed suit. A 2017 study by the Texas 
A&M Transportation Institute found that forty-eight states and the District 
of Columbia had some form of statewide or districtwide regulatory scheme 
imposed on ridesharing.
32
 In June 2018, Vermont imposed a regulatory 
scheme of its own.
33
 As of publication date for this Note, Oregon was the 
only state without statewide regulation on ridesharing, in part due to a 




Legislators introduced these new schemes shortly after tragedy struck in 
Uber’s hometown of San Francisco. In a highly publicized incident on 
December 31, 2013, an Uber driver struck and killed a five-year-old girl 
during “Period 1.”
35
 Uber, as well as Evanston Insurance Company, a 
                                                                                                             
 28. See Dave Lee, What Happened in the City That Banned Uber, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41450980 (discussing Uber and Lyft’s 2016 
ban in Austin, Texas, and its reintroduction one year later after statewide rules preempted the 
tougher municipal regulations); see also Gwyn Topham, Uber Granted Two-Month 
Extension to London Licence, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019, 5:23 AM EDT), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/24/uber-london-licence-transport-for-london 
(discussing Transport for London’s decision not to license Uber due to concerns about 
passenger safety). 
 29. See Macmurdo, supra note 3, at 315. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. MAARIT MORAN, BEN ETTELMAN, GRETCHEN STOELTJE, TODD HANSEN & ASHESH 
PANT, TEX. A&M TRANSP. INST., NO. PRC 17-70 F, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES: FINAL REPORT 3 (2017), https://static.tti.tamu. 
edu/tti.tamu.edu/documents/PRC-17-70-F.pdf.  
 33. Owain James, Uber and Lyft Are Lobbying States to Prohibit Local Regulation, 
MOBILITY LAB (July 24, 2018), https://mobilitylab.org/2018/07/24/uber-and-lyft-are-
lobbying-states-to-prohibit-local-regulation/. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Macmurdo, supra note 3, at 308. 
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surplus lines carrier that works with Uber and issued the policy,
36
 denied 
liability for Uber’s driver.
37
 The companies claimed the driver had no 
passengers “in between calls,” and that Uber’s $1 million liability policy 
did not cover the girl’s wrongful death.
38
  
The resulting case, Liu v. Uber Technologies, Inc., ultimately settled in 
2015.
39
 Uber filed counterclaims against Evanston for bad faith later that 
year.
40
 Nonetheless, the public outcry ensuing from Liu’s worst-case 
scenario compelled California’s legislature to enact new statutes requiring 
minimum coverage during “Period 1.”
41
 
Despite state legislatures’ efforts to mandate “Period 1” coverage, courts 
have generally upheld surplus lines carriers’ policy provisions denying 
liability. For example, in Jean v. James River Insurance Co., the Louisiana 
Court of Appeals held that James River’s practice of waiving uninsured 
motorist (“UM”) coverage during “Period 1” fit within the bounds of the 
state’s rideshare services statute.
42
 The District of Nevada, in Martin v. 
James River Insurance Co., granted James River’s motion to dismiss under 
similar circumstances, saying the driver’s coverage was permissibly 
waived.
43
 In Maxwell v. James River Insurance Co.,
44
 the District of 
Colorado upheld another coverage denial and waiver from James River.
45
 
The court added that Uber could be considered a “livery service” under her 
                                                                                                             
 36. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 15-03988 WHA, 2015 WL 8597239, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at *3 (“Evanston argues that the written terms of its policy preclude coverage 
[for the car accident] as a matter of law.”); Answer & Affirmative Defenses of Defendants 
Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, & Rasier-CA LLC to Plaintiffs‘ Complaint at 2, 6–7, 
Liu v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 2014). 
 39. Order Granting Petition to Approve Compromise of a Minor’s Claim, Liu v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 2015). 
 40. Evanston, 2015 WL 8597239, at *1. 
 41. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5433(c) (2015) (providing that minimum coverage is 
required “from the moment a participating driver logs on to the transportation network 
company’s online-enabled application or platform until the driver accepts a request to 
transport a passenger, and from the moment the driver completes the transaction . . . or the 
ride is complete . . . until the driver either accepts another ride request . . . or logs off”). 
 42. 274 So.3d 43, 46 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2019) (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 201.6 
(2020)).  
 43. 366 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1189–90 (D. Nev. 2019). 
 44. 401 F. Supp. 3d 1183 (D. Colo. 2019). 
 45. Id. at 1189, 1192. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss3/6
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As these cases illustrate, regulators in nearly every state have imposed a 
scheme on ridesharing, but courts still seem to view insurance provisions 
with some degree of stringency. Oklahoma is no exception. 
B. Oklahoma’s Ridesharing Statute & Insurance Law 
1. The OTNC Services Act 
Keeping in line with the national trend towards regulating ridesharing, 
Oklahoma enacted the Oklahoma Transportation Network Company 
(“OTNC”) Services Act in 2015.
47
 Like several other states, Oklahoma 
regulates Uber and other ridesharing services as a separate and distinct 
category of carrier.
48
 The OTNC Services Act’s language openly states 
ridesharing services are not “considered motor carriers of persons . . . 
nor . . . considered to provide taxicab, limousine, or similar for-hire motor 
carrier service.”
49
 Despite the state regulating ridesharing companies as a 
distinct class of carrier and excluding them from being called “motor 
carriers,”
50
 another Oklahoma statute, the Motor Carrier Act of 1995, 
excludes municipal taxi companies from the “common carrier” definition.
51
 
This has not, however, impacted taxi drivers from similar regulations 
imposed by Oklahoma’s municipalities, including mandatory insurance
52
 
and vicarious liability for drivers in the course of employment.
53
 
Because the Motor Carrier Act of 1995 does not include rideshare 
drivers, the Oklahoma legislature has imposed somewhat more relaxed 
regulations. The OTNC Services Act requires ridesharing services to 
maintain “primary automobile insurance” that covers the driver during one 
of two periods: “(1) While the driver is both logged on to and available to 
receive transportation requests on the . . . digital network; or (2) While the 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. 
 47. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1010 (Supp. 2019). 
 48. See id. § 1012; see also MORAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 29 (first citing S.B. 14-125, 
69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014); and then citing S.B. 396, 64th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Mont. 2015)). 
 49. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1012. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 230.23(6)(a) (2011). 
 52. See, e.g., Graves v. Harrington, 60 P.2d 622, 625 (Okla. 1936) (explaining that the 
city ordinance at issue “requires insurance against liability”). 
 53. See Dixie Cab Co. v. Sanders, 1955 OK 150, ¶ 10, 284 P.2d 421, 424; Safeway Cab 
Co. v. McConnell, 1938 OK 2, ¶¶ 3–4, 75 P.2d 884, 885. 
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driver is engaged in providing prearranged rides.”
54
 The Genzer case 
involved coverage during the former period.
55
 The OTNC Services Act 
allows for ridesharing services to maintain insurance when an outside 
company would not provide it.
56
 Finally, the Act also allows surplus lines 
insurers (such as James River) to provide policies.
57
  
2. Uninsured Motorist (UM) Coverage in Oklahoma 
As with all auto insurance policies in Oklahoma, UM coverage is 
required by law for ridesharing services “where not waived” pursuant to 
Oklahoma’s UM statute.
58
 Title 36, section 3636 of the Oklahoma Statutes 
governs this coverage. UM coverage takes effect when an insured driver 
brings forward a claim for “bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including 




The UM statute requires policies “issued, delivered, renewed, or 
extended” in Oklahoma, to “motor vehicle[s] registered or principally 
garaged” in Oklahoma, to have UM coverage.
60
 Yet, the statute also allows 
insureds to reject or waive UM coverage entirely, or select lower liability 
limits, at the mercy of the insurer.
61
 It is important to carefully read the 
policy language that fits the UM statute, particularly since Oklahoma courts 
have based their opinions on specific exclusions and whether they 
contravene the UM statute’s public policy for Oklahoma.
62
  
This focus on specific exclusions encompasses a wide range of issues. 
For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed a denial of UM 
coverage for a vehicle principally garaged and driven in Texas because 
Oklahoma’s UM statute specifically applied to cars “registered or 
principally garaged in” Oklahoma.
63
 On the other hand, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court verdict allowing UM benefits to be 
                                                                                                             
 54. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1025(A)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2019). 
 55. Id. § 1025(B)(1); see Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th 
Cir. 2019) (stating that the accident at issue occurred while Genzer, an Uber driver, was 
returning from dropping off a passenger). 
 56. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1025(D)–(E). 
 57. Id. § 1025(F). 
 58. Id. § 1025(B)(2). 
 59. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 3636(B) (Supp. 2019). 
 60. Id. § 3636(A). 
 61. Id. § 3636(G). 
 62. See Dawn M. Goeres, Oklahoma’s Uninsured Motorist Coverage Statute – An 
Overview, 88 OKLA. BAR J. 1951, 1951–52 (2017). 
 63. Bernal v. Charter Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 OK 28, ¶¶ 13–14, 209 P.3d 309, 316. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss3/6





 when another state’s law, and the terms of the policy, permit it, 
even if Oklahoma law does not.
65
 Looking at the UM statute and the terms 
of the policy in tandem is crucial to understanding whether a given policy 
violates Oklahoma law. 
3. Surplus Lines Coverage in Oklahoma 
Another type of insurance coverage applicable to ridesharing services is 
surplus lines coverage, which covers risks not included in conventional 
policies. In Oklahoma, surplus lines insurers operate through licensees and 
brokers “on properties, risks or exposures located or to be performed in a 
state allowing non-admitted insurers to do business.”
66
 These groups can 
place the coverage with a surplus lines insurer “[i]f a particular insurance 
coverage or type, class, or kind of coverage is not readily procurable from 
authorized insurers in Oklahoma.”
67
 Insurance contracts that are 
“effectuated by a surplus lines insurer” in violation of Oklahoma law are 
voidable unless the insured says otherwise.
68
 Oklahoma maintains a list of 
surplus lines insurers that are eligible to operate in the state; the Oklahoma 




4. “Mend the Hold” 
Understanding Genzer also requires an explanation of a long-standing 
jurisprudential relic known as “mend the hold” doctrine. This theory 
formed one of the central arguments in Genzer’s case.
70
 First advanced by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1877, “mend the hold” doctrine was affirmed in 
principle by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1906.
71
 Quoting the U.S. 
Supreme Court case, the language of this theory is as follows: “Where a 
party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching anything 
                                                                                                             
 64. See Goeres, supra note 62, at 1952 (defining stacking as “a situation in which 
multiple vehicles are identified on a policy and the insured pays separate UM premiums for 
each, thereby permitting the insured to recover the UM limit for each listed vehicle rather 
than the single UM limit identified on the policy”). 
 65. Leritz v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2016 OK 79, ¶¶ 3–4, 385 P.3d 991, 993. 
 66. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1100.1(10) (2011). 
 67. Id. § 1108. 
 68. Id. § 1102. 
 69. Company Type: Surplus Lines, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://sbs.naic.org/ 
solar-external-lookup/lookup/company/summary/44197344?jurisdiction=OK (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2021). 
 70. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co, 934 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 71. Morrison v. Atkinson, 1906 OK 25, 85 P. 472. 
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involved in a controversy, he cannot, after litigation has begun, change his 
ground, and put his conduct upon another and a different consideration. He 
is not permitted thus to mend his hold.”
72
  
Fundamentally, “mend the hold” fits two doctrinal spectra. In the 
procedural context, by barring defenses to be raised in litigation, it brushes 
up against the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
73
 In the more accepted 




The Seventh Circuit case Harbor Insurance Co. v. Continental Bank 
Corp. is an oft-cited example of “mend the hold” as applied to insurance 
claims.
75
 Harbor involved a coverage denial by Harbor Insurance Company 
and Allstate Insurance Company, which provided liability insurance for 
Continental Bank’s directors and officers.
76
 Harbor and Allstate initially 
denied coverage for the defendant directors’ “egregious” behavior, but then 
filed a counterclaim, stating there was no misconduct.
77
 As such, Harbor 
and Allstate changed their defense theory midway through litigation.
78
  
In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the court held this inconsistent 
denial created a question of fact, and that “mend the hold” formed part of 
the insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing in treating its claim.
79
 Judge 
Posner agreed with the bank that “one might suppose that the insurance 
companies owed their insured a fuller inquiry before denying liability on 
what proved to be an untenable ground” when the insurance companies 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. ¶ 8, 85 P. at 473 (emphasis added) (quoting Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. McCarthy, 
96 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1877)). 
 73. See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 364 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(observing that the “mend the hold” doctrine “embodies an antithetical conception of the 
litigation process, one in which a party is expected to have all his pins in perfect order when 
he files his first pleading” because, in contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a 
party to state “as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of 
consistency” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2)). 
 74. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Comment, “Mend the Hold” and Erie: Why an Obscure 
Contracts Doctrine Should Control in Federal Diversity Cases, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1059, 
1068–69 (1998) (“Over the last fifty years, courts applying the laws of Delaware, the District 
of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont have enforced this version of the doctrine either by name or 
in practice at least once.”). 
 75. 922 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 76. Id. at 359. 
 77. Id. at 359–60. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 362–63. 
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In Harbor, the Seventh Circuit also addressed concerns about the reach 
of “mend the hold” by interpreting it in two ways. On one hand, when 
viewed in a procedural manner, Judge Posner’s opinion expressed concern 
that “mend the hold” would conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and force litigants to “have all their pins in order” before 
asserting defenses.
81
 On the other hand, courts in Illinois (Harbor’s 
jurisdiction) applied “mend the hold” as a doctrine that “estops a contract 
party to change the ground on which he has refused to perform the contract, 
whether or not it was a ground stated in a pleading, or otherwise in the 
course of litigation.”
82
 This contractual version of “mend the hold” has 
since applied to the insurance law arena in Oklahoma (although not 
explicitly by name) as an intersection between the nuances of insurance 




The seminal “mend the hold” case in Oklahoma is Buzzard v. Farmers 
Insurance Co. In Buzzard, Farmers’s adjusters sought to introduce evidence 
that its insured was speeding.
84
 Farmers presented this novel theory despite 
initially encouraging its insureds to settle with a liability carrier, only to 
deny coverage after the fact.
85
 Put another way by the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, the comparative negligence defense “was neither internally noted by 
Farmers nor communicated to plaintiffs as a reason for delay or denial of 
the claim.”
86
 The court also stated Farmers could not rely on testimony 
from an accident reconstructionist in support of denying the claim because 
the evaluation happened after Farmers’s denial.
87
  
Buzzard ultimately forbade Farmers from introducing evidence of its 
insured’s negligence without having communicated its intent to the 
insured’s decedents before litigation started.
88
 Based on this precedent, 
Oklahoma courts do not permit an insurer to “mend the hold.” In Genzer, 
James River makes a similar shift in theories between initial representation 
                                                                                                             
 80. Id. at 364.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. See, e.g., Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 1991 OK 127, ¶¶ 11–17, 824 P.2d 1105, 
1108–10; Brown v. Patel, 2007 OK 16, ¶¶ 12–13, 157 P.3d 117, 122–23. 
 84. Buzzard, ¶¶ 15–17, 824 P.2d at 1109–10. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. ¶ 43, 824 P.2d at 1114. 
 88. Id. ¶ 17, 824 P.2d at 1110. 
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to its insured and its theory in litigation, but the court did not specifically 
apply Buzzard’s precedent to Genzer’s facts. 
III. Statement of the Case 
A. Facts 
On April 17, 2017, Uber driver Bonni Genzer picked up a passenger at 
Will Rogers World Airport in Oklahoma City and drove him nearly 140 
miles to Woodward.
89
 During Genzer’s return drive to Oklahoma City, a 
large metal object fell from a semi-trailer truck and smashed through her 
windshield.
90
 After the accident, Genzer made a claim for UM coverage 
benefits to James River, Uber’s insurer, on May 3, 2017.
91
 She asserted she 
was using the UberPartner application while on her return journey.
92
  
The major issue in Genzer was whether one of the driver’s two James 
River policies (issued through Uber) applied to her incident. The first 
policy, known as the “100 Policy,” applies when an Uber driver logged into 
UberPartner is either en route to pick up a passenger or is on public airport 
premises.
93
 The other, the “200 Policy,” covers “Period 1,” when an Uber 
driver logged in to the application is available for requests but has not yet 
accepted a ride.
94
 Only the “100 Policy” allowed for UM coverage at the 
time of incident.
95
 Yet, a James River claims examiner initially used the 
“200 Policy” to disclaim Genzer’s coverage instead, despite Genzer 
admitting she waived that coverage.
96
 
In back-and-forth correspondence between the examiner and Genzer’s 
counsel, the examiner reiterated that Genzer was not logged into the 
UberPartner application at the time of the incident.
97
 When Genzer asserted 
she was online and seeking a fare, James River’s claims examiner replied 




                                                                                                             
 89. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-855-SLP, 2018 WL 11240482, at *1, 
*6 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2018) (granting summary judgment to James River and denying 
partial summary judgment to Genzer). 
 90. Id. at *1. 
 91. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1158. 
 94. Id. at 1159. 
 95. Id. at 1161. 
 96. Id. at 1161 & n.11. 
 97. Id. at 1159. 
 98. Id. at 1160. 
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Ultimately, James River denied the claim on the sole basis that Genzer 
had not been logged into the UberPartner application at the time of injury—
leaving open the question of whether Genzer operated a covered “auto” 
under the “100 Policy.”
99
 
B. Procedural History 
After James River denied Genzer’s benefits, she filed a breach of 
contract suit in Blaine County District Court.
100
 Along with the coverage 
issue, Genzer argued “mend the hold” was applicable.
101
 Since James River 
asserted the defense that Genzer was offline at the time of the incident, it 
waived any possibility of asserting the defense that she was not operating a 
covered “auto” at the time of the incident.
102
 James River subsequently 
removed the case to the Western District of Oklahoma.
103
 James River then 
filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Genzer did not 
have coverage, albeit not relying on Genzer’s “alleged offline status.”
104
 
Genzer filed a motion for partial summary judgment the same day, claiming 
coverage under a “100 Policy” provision endorsement—subpart (a)(2)—for 
“traveling to the final destination[s] of the requested transportation services 
including, but not limited to, dropping-off of passenger(s).”
105
  
The Western District of Oklahoma subsequently granted James River’s 
motion and denied Genzer’s.
106
 The order found Morrison v. Atkinson and 
“mend the hold” inapplicable, because it did not believe James River had 
“taken opposite positions on the same issue during this litigation.”
107
 The 
order also asserted the main policy provision Genzer called ambiguous—
“traveling to the final destination[s] of the requested transportation services 
including, but not limited to, dropping-off of passenger(s)”—was not 
ambiguous after all.
108
 In the trial court’s view, “[a] passenger who hires a 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-855-SLP, 2018 WL 11240482, at *5 
(W.D. Okla. June 4, 2018). 
 102. Id. Genzer argued that “an insurance company must decide which defenses apply 
and assert those when it denies a claim. In doing so, all other defenses that the insurance 
company knew of at the time it denied the claim are waived.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
 103. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1160. 
 104. Id. at 1163. 
 105. Id. at 1158, 1167. 
 106. Id. at 1160. 
 107. Genzer, 2018 WL 11240482, at *5–*6. 
 108. Id. at *3–*4. 
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driver via Uber surely does not care where the driver goes after dropping 
the passenger off at his or her desired destination.”
109
 The court only briefly 
addressed Oklahoma’s UM statute and James River’s “200 Policy” in a 
footnote, calling both irrelevant to Genzer’s cause of action.
110
 
IV. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision—A Strict Approach 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court order granting 
summary judgment to James River.
111
 Genzer’s issues, as interpreted by the 
Tenth Circuit, were (1) whether “mend the hold” applied in Oklahoma as 
asserted by Genzer, and (2) whether the covered auto endorsement of the 
“100 Policy” was ambiguous.
112
 The Tenth Circuit concluded that neither 
was the case, rejecting Genzer’s claim for coverage.
113
 
The Tenth Circuit started its analysis by first examining whether “mend 
the hold” applies to James River’s differing rationale for denying coverage 
during litigation.
114
 It asserted James River shifted its rationale simply 
because it “tracked Genzer’s shifting theory of coverage.”
115
 In the Tenth 
Circuit’s view, the “200 Policy” applied to the facts “as Genzer had recited 
them” in her initial representation to James River because she “had been 
‘available’ for ride requests.”
116
 Yet, Genzer’s actual suit invoked the “100 
Policy,” and she stated in her complaint that “she had in fact been 
‘providing’ transportation services.”
117
 Without addressing the subtle 
difference between “available for” and “providing” ride requests, the court 
ends by saying “[t]he mend-the-hold doctrine’s applicability in these 
circumstances is unlikely in any jurisdiction.”
118
 
Next, the Tenth Circuit seemed to question whether “mend the hold” 
applies in Oklahoma at all, citing an unpublished Eastern District of 
Oklahoma case and its appeal in the circuit.
119
 The Tenth Circuit interpreted 
Morrison’s mention of “mend the hold” as part of the overarching contract 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. at *4. 
 110. Id. at *2 n.4. 
 111. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1158. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1169. 
 114. Id. at 1160–61. 
 115. Id. at 1163. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1164 & n.20 (first citing Fry v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. CIV-14-131-
RAW, 2015 WL 519706, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 9, 2015); and then citing Fry v. Am. Home 
Assurance Co., 636 F. App’x 764, 766 (10th Cir. 2016)). 
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rule that “arguments not asserted at trial are waived on appeal.”
120
 Ergo, the 
“mend the hold” doctrine does not bar parties from switching rationales 
during litigation entirely.
121
 Even though the Tenth Circuit noted that 
several cases after Morrison use “mend the hold” language, it stated the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court “has never endorsed the doctrine as a constraint 
on an alleged nonperforming party in a breach-of-contract action changing 
its prelitigation defenses.”
122
 The Tenth Circuit then set aside the cases that 
Genzer cited using the prelitigation “mend the hold” doctrine, including 
Buzzard,
123
 by saying the court does not explicitly invoke it, stating: 
Any resemblance [to the precedents Genzer cites] is irrelevant, 
though, because Genzer does not allege that James River initially 
denied coverage in bad faith. In fact, she seeks to limit James 
River to its prelitigation denial irrespective of its good-faith basis 
for that denial. Such an absolute bar to changing positions is 
plainly incongruous with a conception of the mend-the-hold 
doctrine rooted in the duty of good faith.
124
  
James River’s denial of coverage, in the Tenth Circuit’s view, was not in 
bad faith; it seemingly gave “fair notice” of its rationale during litigation—
citing the unpublished Fry v. American Home Assurance Co. appellate 
opinion as its primary metric for “mend the hold.”
125
 The court also 
assumed that because James River “continues to argue that Genzer had 
been offline . . . even as it argues that she had already completed the 
accepted services,” James River was maintaining “additional, consistent 
defenses to contract performance” in its denial of Genzer’s coverage.
126
  
The Tenth Circuit accused Genzer of relying on extra-jurisdictional 
authority in citing cases such as Harbor, adding that “Oklahoma courts 
haven’t seen fit to adopt” the doctrine.
127
 Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit’s 
conclusion, that applying “mend the hold” in Genzer “would be 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 1164. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1164–65. 
 123. See supra Section II.B.4 (discussing this case’s applicability to “mend the hold” in 
Oklahoma). 
 124. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1165. 
 125. Id. at 1166 (stating that, according to the Fry opinion, “the mend the hold doctrine 
‘seems to require only fair notice of the theory for denying coverage’”) (citing Fry v. Am. 
Home Assurance Co., 636 F. App’x 764, 766 (10th Cir. 2016))). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1165 (noting Genzer’s reliance on Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922 
F.2d 357, 363 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
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In its analysis of Genzer’s breach of contract issue, the Tenth Circuit 
strictly construed the “100 Policy.” Specifically, the court looked at the 
policy’s covered-auto endorsement provision of “traveling to the final 
destination of the requested transportation services including, but not 
limited to, dropping-off of passenger(s).”
129
 It upheld the district court’s 
view of this provision: Genzer’s coverage ended at the final destination of 
the passenger, not that of the driver, regardless of the distance.
130
 A 
different result would theoretically mean that “after accepting a single ride 
request, a driver would continue occupying a ‘covered auto’ throughout her 
travels, even when offline and driving for strictly personal reasons.”
131
 This 
would go beyond the “discrete stages of the ridesharing process” instituted 
in the provision.
132
 The court ended its analysis by citing another provision 
of the “100 Policy” where, “immediately following the conclusion of the 
requested transportation services,” the policy covers the driver “while in the 
course of exiting [airport premises].”
133
 In the court’s view, then, the 
coverage omission for cases like Genzer’s was “deliberate.”
134
 
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Genzer opinion by stating 
“there is no ambiguity to construe in Genzer’s favor . . . Though we 
sympathize with Genzer’s misfortune and injuries, this outcome is dictated 
by the covered-auto endorsement’s plain terms.”
135
 
V. Analysis  
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Genzer constricts the policy to the 
plainest terms and confuses the issues. The court’s flat rejection of “mend 
the hold” in Oklahoma does not account for that doctrine’s complex 
intersection with contract and tort law. Further, the court places too much 
weight on the language of James River’s insurance policy prima facie. In 
doing so, it failed to account for James River’s history of issuing policies 
contravening Oklahoma law, the “reasonable expectations” doctrine 
governing Oklahoma insurance contracts, and the novel nature of Uber as a 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. at 1156 (citing Ryerson Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 129. Id. at 1167. 
 130. Id. at 1168. 
 131. Id. at 1169. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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service. By taking James River at its word, the Genzer decision ultimately 
furthers a detrimental public policy, not just in giving insurers the benefit of 
the doubt in switching rationales for denying coverage, but in refusing to 
close a regulatory loophole for ridesharing services. 
A. No More “Mend the Hold” in Oklahoma? 
While Oklahoma courts have not applied “mend the hold” by name, they 
frequently apply its principles, phrased as a sort of cousin to equitable 
estoppel.
136
 Both the district court’s order and Tenth Circuit’s opinion cast 
doubt on the “mend the hold” doctrine’s application in insurance, and the 
Tenth Circuit’s opinion erred further in failing to consider Oklahoma’s 
precedent on the matter. Insurers owe insureds a tort duty of good faith and 
fair dealing in handling claims such as Genzer’s, and Oklahoma courts have 
extended this tort duty to an insurer’s contractual duty as well.
137
 
Besides resorting to unpublished cases in saying “mend the hold” does 
not apply in Oklahoma by name,
138
 the Tenth Circuit seems to misinterpret 
the Seventh Circuit’s Harbor case governing “mend the hold” as applied to 
Genzer’s case: 
Of course, the analysis is different for during-litigation positional 
shifts. A party that asserts one defense to contract performance 
in response to the complaint, then when that defense fails asserts 
a different defense—even a consistent one—might be attempting 
unfairly to take a better hold. But here, James River . . . denied 
coverage before litigation based on Genzer’s factual account, 




Yet, the Tenth Circuit seems to neglect the clear distinction in Harbor 
between procedural “mend the hold,” which bars parties from switching 
litigation defenses, and contractual “mend the hold,” which bars parties 
from switching grounds for contract denial.
140
 It is admittedly a subtle 
difference, but a key one. Genzer never attempted to stop James River from 
                                                                                                             
 136. See supra Section II.B.4.  
 137. Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 1977 OK 141, ¶¶ 6, 25, 577 P.2d 899, 901, 
904–05 (“Breach of the duty sounds in tort, notwithstanding that it also constitutes a breach 
of contract . . . .”). 
 138. See supra Part IV. 
 139. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1166 n.25 (citing Harbor v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 
363 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 140. See Harbor, 922 F.2d at 364 (explaining the difference between the procedural and 
substantive (i.e., contractual) versions of “mend the hold”). 
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asserting the defense that she did not operate a covered “auto.” In using 
“mend the hold,” she attempted to stop James River from asserting different 
grounds for denial than those already communicated to her. 
As with Farmers in Buzzard,
141
 James River decided to change its theory 
midway through litigation to assert a different reason for denying its 
contract performance. In Buzzard, Farmers could not introduce evidence 
obtained after the beginning of litigation to present a new theory denying 
liability for its insured.
142
 Similarly, James River should not have been 
allowed to explicitly say “available or offline, there isn’t coverage” without 
having communicated to Genzer why there was no coverage. The Tenth 
Circuit even implicitly said as much in footnote 16 of the opinion: 
[E]ven accepting James River’s interpretation [that uninsured-
motorist coverage was available and that a different policy was 
being discussed], it doesn’t explain why James River disclaimed 
coverage. The phrase “available or offline, there isn’t coverage” 
states only the conclusion that there isn’t coverage, not why there 
isn’t coverage. It certainly does not contemplate James River’s 
current rationale for denying coverage, i.e., that Genzer had 
already dropped off her passenger before the accident. The 
rationale that there isn’t coverage whether Genzer was “available 
or offline” doesn’t admit of such a specific meaning.
143
  
Footnote 23 of the opinion also serves as an extreme example of strict 
construction in acknowledging why “mend the hold” would not apply here. 
The Tenth Circuit stated that Genzer acknowledged an inherent difference 
between bad faith and “mend the hold,” simply because her reply brief used 
the word “or” in describing the two.
144
 Perhaps the Tenth Circuit aimed to 
nullify the precedents Genzer brought forth to show that modern “mend the 
hold” forms part of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, even if “mend 
the hold” was never mentioned by name in the body of the case.  
At any rate, the differences alleged by the Tenth Circuit amount to little 
more than semantics. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s language in Buzzard 
                                                                                                             
 141. See Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 1991 OK 127, ¶¶ 13–18, 824 P.2d 1105, 1109–10 
(stating that the insurance company raised a defense that was neither “internally noted by 
[the insurance company] nor communicated to plaintiffs as a reason for delay or denial of 
[plaintiffs’] claim”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1162 n.16. 
 144. Id. at 1165 n.23 (stating that Genzer “[used] the disjunctive ‘or’ to distinguish ‘a bad 
faith theory or a mend-the-hold theory’”). 
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necessarily implied “mend the hold” in an insurance bad faith claim. 
According to the Buzzard court, an “insurer must conduct an investigation 
reasonably appropriate under the circumstances,” centering the inquiry on 




As such, before the Genzer decision, an insurer was not permitted to 
“mend its hold.” Yet, the Genzer decision throws this precedent into doubt, 
despite the Tenth Circuit previously upholding Buzzard as good law several 
months prior to the Genzer decision.
146
 Unlike the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court in Buzzard, the Tenth Circuit in Genzer allowed the insurer to say it 
denied its insurer’s claim for a different reason than it had initially 
expressed to its insured. 
B. James River’s Insurance Policies and Oklahoma Law 
Genzer also failed to address some major ambiguities in Oklahoma’s 
insurance law that have become increasingly important with the rise of 
ridesharing. The Genzer opinion does not mention any Oklahoma insurance 
statutes applicable to waiving UM coverage or surplus lines coverage, even 
though the case’s claims indirectly raise both issues. The district court’s 
order brushed off the nuances involving Genzer’s UM coverage waiver 
with the following footnote: “Because Plaintiff does not claim a violation of 
this statute (if she could do so in a civil action), the statute is irrelevant to 
the issues before the Court.”
147
 Outside of a brief mention that James River 
disclaimed its “200 Policy” coverage,
148
 the Tenth Circuit’s opinion does 
not mention this issue at all. 
Of course, conventional insurers still express a degree of wariness 
towards ridesharing’s distinct risks. A 2015 report by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) stated that personal 
auto insurance carriers’ concerns about ridesharing included, inter alia, 
“[c]onfusion regarding which insurer has a duty to defend,” and which 
insurer has a duty to indemnify.
149
 This confusion arises from the unique 
                                                                                                             
 145. Buzzard, ¶ 14, 824 P.2d at 1109. 
 146. Thomas v. Farmers Ins. Co., 774 F. App’x 430, 432 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[E]vidence 
that supports a post-denial rationalization, rather than the evidence that the insurance 
company actually relied on when initially denying a claim, is inadmissible under Buzzard.”). 
 147. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-855-SLP, 2018 WL 11240482, at *2 
n.4 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2018). 
 148. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1163. 
 149. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY INSURANCE 
PRINCIPLES FOR LEGISLATORS AND REGULATORS 8 (2015), https://www.naic.org/prod_serv/ 
TNC-OP-15.pdf. 
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way ridesharing services use surplus lines coverage; in addition to insuring 
the ridesharing company’s risks, the surplus lines carrier also covers any 




In theory, the surplus lines carrier’s allocation of risks from the 
ridesharing company and its drivers should make the coverage operate in 
tandem with the drivers’ personal policies. Yet, again, this is usually not the 
case.
151
 The NAIC urged regulators and legislators to “consider requiring 
UM [coverage] in the same amount as liability coverage” for ridesharing.
152
 
In a similar vein, the NAIC warned that omitting UM coverage would leave 




The Oklahoma statute fits the NAIC’s standard. It states that, “while a 
[ridesharing] driver is both logged on to the [ridesharing company]’s digital 
network and available to receive transportation requests but is not engaged 
in prearranged rides”—in other words, “Period 1”—there must be “[UM] 
coverage where not waived.”
154
 The Oklahoma ridesharing statute also 
implicitly acknowledges the complicated nature of Uber’s insurance policy 
by allowing for insurance “with an insurer authorized to do business in this 
state or with a surplus lines insurer eligible under [the surplus lines 
statute].”
155
 As such, neither the district court’s order, nor the Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion, raised the issue that James River, as a surplus lines 
insurer, is not licensed to sell policies in Oklahoma. 
The Northern District of Oklahoma, however, explicitly recognized this 
issue in another case involving a James River policy with terms that might 
potentially contradict Oklahoma law on waiving an insurance policy. 
Although the district court in that case ultimately ruled in James River’s 
favor,
156
 the statute and waiver involved share some key differences with 
the UM and ridesharing statutes at issue in Genzer.  
In James River Insurance Co. v. Blue Ox Dance Hall, LLC, the insurer 
sued for declaratory judgment against a night club and its owners on the 
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. at 9. 
 151. See supra Part I. 
 152. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 149, at 17. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1025(B)(2) (Supp. 2019). 
 155. Id. § 1025(F). 
 156. James River Ins. Co. v. Blue Ox Dance Hall, LLC (Blue Ox I), No. 16-CV-0151-
CVE-FHM, 2017 WL 2367052, at *8 (N.D. Okla. May 31, 2017). 
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grounds that a provision in its liability policy was valid.
157
 The policy 
provision at issue, called “defense within limits,” allowed James River to 
deduct claims expenses and defense costs from the assault and battery 
coverage limit on its premium.
158
 Blue Ox argued the deductions violated 
an Oklahoma statute that prohibited defense costs from being included 
within the limits of liability of any insurance policy “made, issued, or 
delivered by any insurer or by any agent” operating within the state.
159
  
James River’s motion for partial summary judgment in Blue Ox I 
asserted, rather strikingly, that its status as a surplus lines carrier gave it the 
ability to include a provision contrary to Oklahoma law.
160
 The court opted 
to defer a ruling and have James River brief the issue more fully in a second 
motion.
161
 After James River briefed a second motion for partial summary 
judgment, the court dismissed the case.
162
 The court cited the Oklahoma 
Insurance Commissioner’s waiver, which stated that preventing an insurer 
from including a “defense within limits” provision otherwise contrary to 
Oklahoma law would “cause a market availability problem for the persons 
or risks covered by such insurance policies, forcing consumers to obtain 
coverage from non-admitted insurers.”
163
  
The Oklahoma ridesharing statute does implicitly acknowledge the 
complicated nature of Uber’s insurance policy by allowing for insurance 
“with an insurer authorized to do business in this state or with a surplus 
lines insurer eligible under [the surplus lines statute].”
164
 Of course, the 
risks of ridesharing are indeed distinct from those in a conventional 
insurance policy.
165
 Yet, this discrepancy does not reconcile James River’s 
disclaimer of coverage, even if the facts do not allege any impropriety with 
a coverage waiver.  
                                                                                                             
 157. Id. at *1. 
 158. James River Ins. Co. v. Blue Ox Dance Hall, LLC (Blue Ox II), No. 16-CV-0151-
CVE-FHM, 2017 WL 5195877, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2017). 
 159. Blue Ox I, 2017 WL 2367052, at *6 (citing OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:15-1-15 
(2020)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Blue Ox II, 2017 WL 5195877, at *4. 
 163. Id. 
 164. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1025(F) (Supp. 2019). 
 165. See Commercial Ride-Sharing, supra note 10 (“Ride-sharing is different, however, 
than taking a traditional taxi or limousine. Taxis and limousines are typically licensed by the 
state and/or local transportation authority. . . . [Ride-Sharers] may not be subject to the same 
requirements that apply to taxis and limousines.”). 
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For example, James River’s “200 Policy” allowed for UM coverage in 
Kansas, but not Oklahoma, without explanation as to why.
166
 While the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court has acknowledged the UM statute’s “legislative 
intent . . . could arguably be satisfied with the acceptance of UM insurance 
with agreed-upon exclusions from coverage,”
167
 this premise relies on the 
policyholder’s decision to accept or reject UM coverage.
168
 As such, the 
court has repeatedly voided comparable insurance policy provisions 
“[purporting] to condition, limit, or dilute” coverage in violation of the UM 
statute, from insurers licensed to do business in the state.
169
  
Surplus lines coverage does fit an important niche in insurance law. It 
should not, however, give insurers free reign to introduce policies that 
contradict Oklahoma law, at least without arguing their exclusion would, in 
a similar vein to the Blue Ox II case, cause a “market availability problem” 
for Uber and other ridesharing services.
170
  
C. “Unambiguous” Terms and “Reasonable Expectations” 
Insurance contracts, like Genzer and James River’s, are considered 
contracts of adhesion because of the disproportionate bargaining power 
between two parties.
171
 Oklahoma courts must, therefore, construe any 
ambiguities in insurance contracts against the insurer.
172
 Even though the 
Tenth Circuit called James River’s policy exclusions unambiguous on their 
face,
173
 the devil is in the details. The footnotes accompanying the opinion’s 
rationale for strict construction seem to preclude summary judgment. Given 
Uber’s history with insurance coverage, the Tenth Circuit’s construction 
does not sit well with one of Oklahoma’s major contract law doctrines. 
According to the Tenth Circuit in Genzer, “[The James River policy] 
plainly defines coverage as being coterminous with a passenger’s 
‘requested transportation services,’ which conclude when the passenger 
reaches his or her ‘final destination’ and fully exits the vehicle with his or 
her belongings.”
174
 The court further stated that to “construe the 
                                                                                                             
 166. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1162 n.15 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 167. Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 2009 OK 38, ¶ 28, 221 P.3d 717, 727. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Brown v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 1984 OK 55, ¶ 6, 684 P.2d 1195, 1198 
(collecting cases). 
 170. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 171. Wilson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1980 OK 9, ¶ 8, 605 P.2d 1327, 1329. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir. 2019). 
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passenger’s ‘requested transportation services’ as somehow including the 
driver’s destination” would also be illogical.
175
 
Yet, the Tenth Circuit’s construction of James River’s policy language 
clashes with Oklahoma’s contract law precedent, particularly the 
“reasonable expectations” doctrine. In the case Max True Plastering Co. v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
adopted the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, which provides that any 
ambiguities creating a “reasonable expectation of coverage in the insured” 
must be viewed as including that expectation.
176
 The Genzer decision did 
cite Max True for its provision that “insurance contracts are ambiguous 
only if they are susceptible to two constructions,”
177
 but failed to consider 
the true reach of Max True’s holding.  
Max True also encompassed “contracts containing unexpected exclusions 
arising from technical or obscure language or which are hidden in policy 
provisions.”
178
 Arguably, James River’s initial and subsequent rationales 
for its exclusion of Genzer’s coverage both fit this sphere. James River’s 
bare statement in its initial denial—that “available or offline, there isn’t 
coverage”—served as a conclusion without a rationale.
179
  
The Tenth Circuit’s strict construction of “requested transportation 
services,”
180
 however, seems to fit right in line with Uber’s original policy 
not to provide insurance coverage during the time between requests.
181
 
Indeed, Uber’s policy before the Liu case
182
 targeted an even narrower 
window, with “providing services” meaning the time when a driver had 
passengers in her car.
183
 This creates a problem, because a ride request 
cannot be fulfilled if the driver has not logged in to the Uber app.
184
 The 
driver would effectively have been “offline” at this time, creating a 
coverage gap. 
The Tenth Circuit’s construction of these terms in Genzer seems to 
provide a similar result. It appears “unexpected” to not account for Uber’s 
checkered regulatory history or an Uber driver’s availability to take 
                                                                                                             
 175. Id. at 1168 (emphasis added). 
 176. 1996 OK 28, ¶¶ 8, 24, 912 P.2d 861, 864–65, 870. 
 177. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1167 (citing Max True, ¶ 20, 912 P.2d at 869). 
 178. Max True, ¶ 17, 912 P.2d at 868. 
 179. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1162 & n.16. 
 180. See supra Section III.B, Part IV. 
 181. See Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1168; Lieber, supra note 7. 
 182. See supra Section II.A.  
 183. See Lieber, supra note 7. 
 184. See Emily Dobson, Transportation Network Companies: How Should South 
Carolina Adjust Its Regulatory Framework?, 66 S.C. L. REV. 701, 706–07 (2015). 
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requests during a return drive. As such, the Tenth Circuit erred by not 
reading the James River policy’s provisions in line with the “reasonable 
expectation” that Genzer would have received coverage for her injury while 
returning from a passenger drop-off. 
D. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision Furthers a Detrimental Public Policy 
The Tenth Circuit’s strict construction of Genzer’s policy sets back 
regulators’ efforts to rein in ridesharing. Even if the problems of UM 
coverage, ineffective surplus lines coverage, and Oklahoma’s ridesharing 
statute were not raised as potential issues in Genzer, the facts implicate all 
three and would, in tandem, undermine the language in James River’s 
insurance policy as the Tenth Circuit reads it. 
Just as transportation regulations are a state law issue, so, too, is 
insurance (and perhaps even on the municipal level, particularly in cases 
where state law preempts municipal law).
185
 Yet, just because Uber, Lyft, 
and other ridesharing services began their operation outside of the normal 
regulatory scheme does not give them free reign to hire insurers that operate 
on a lesser standard.  
Uber itself argued as much when it sued another one of its surplus lines 
insurers, Evanston Insurance Company, for bad faith based on the policy at 
issue in the Liu case.
186
 In the resulting case, Evanston Insurance Co. v. 
Uber Technologies, Inc., the Northern District of California denied 
Evanston’s motion to dismiss Uber’s bad faith claim.
187
 Evanston argued its 
policy only applied to Uber’s business, and not “any loss resulting from 
automobile use away from Uber’s office buildings,” and further argued 
Uber’s payment of reformation “somehow forfeited [its] right to allege a 
bad faith claim.”
188
 The Northern District of California called Evanston’s 
application “absurd,” stating its policy “would only apply to car accidents 
occurring in the hallways of Uber office buildings.”
189
 It also stated Uber’s 
reformation did not create an issue, explaining “the written terms 
themselves” were the basis of the alleged bad faith denial.
190
  
                                                                                                             
 185. See supra Part I; Eliana Dockterman, Uber and Lyft Are Leaving Austin After 
Losing Background Check Vote, FORTUNE (May 8, 2016, 2:02 PM CDT), https://fortune. 
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Elbowed Uber Is Trying to Make Nice, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2015, 10:33 PM ET), 
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 186. See supra Section II.A. 
 187. No. C 15-03988 WHA, 2015 WL 8597239, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015). 
 188. Id. at *3–4. 
 189. Id. at *3.  
 190. Id. at *4. 
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From California to Oklahoma, it seems Uber has not learned from its 
attack on Evanston’s insurance policy. Uber’s service might very well be 
one-size-fits-all, but that should not factor into the creation of similarly 
uniform insurance policies. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit’s strict analysis in 
Genzer proves harmful. Courts should look far more carefully at insurance 
policy exclusions such as James River’s. 
VI. Conclusion 
At first blush, Genzer might seem like a simple insurance law case 
upholding a policy exclusion, particularly when divorced from the 
circumstances surrounding the case. But as the first federal appellate court 
case to tackle policy exclusions put forward by an insurer of a ridesharing 
company, Genzer sets a precedent of strict construction that gives insurers 
too much deference in this emerging area of litigation.  
Genzer also casts uncertainty on the longstanding “mend the hold” 
contract doctrine’s application in Oklahoma, even with clear state precedent 
that the doctrine has barred insurers from switching their rationales for 
denying coverage. It also conflicts with another longstanding Oklahoma 
contract doctrine, the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, in its construction 
of a coverage denial. Allowing insurers, especially surplus lines insurers 
that do not even operate in applicable states, to essentially waive coverage 
based on minutiae should raise eyebrows.  
After James River’s business decision to part ways with Uber, 





CSAA, through a new subsidiary called Mobilitas,
193
 have begun offering 
coverage specifically for ridesharing. Whether the retention of 
“conventional” insurers, as opposed to a “surplus lines” insurer like James 
River, will have an impact on Uber’s policies on the judicial front remains 
to be seen. Any resulting circuit split would not only require similar 
litigation to move past the settlement or arbitration stage, but would also 
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require another jurisdiction to have the tenacity to go against the 
ridesharing juggernaut. 
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